The Texas Supreme Court recently reversed the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment entered after a jury found that a national grocery store firm client was not negligent.

After the Plaintiff slipped and fell at a Randalls grocery store, she alleged that Randalls failed to properly warn of a puddle that formed next to a shopping cart after an employee put leaking items in the cart. After a jury trial, the Harris County jury sided with our client and declined to find Randalls liable because the jury did not believe that Randalls reasonably should have known of the danger. The court bifurcated the premises liability question, so based on that answer, the court’s charge instructed the jury not to answer the actual knowledge question.

The Plaintiff appealed to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the jury should have been permitted to consider Randalls’ liability under the actual knowledge standard—even after finding no liability under the constructive knowledge standard. Although the court of appeals found that “[t]here was no evidence that a Randalls employee observed any liquid on the floor where Mohammadi slipped and fell before she slipped and fell,” it nevertheless concluded that the Plaintiff was entitled to a jury question on actual knowledge.

In a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the actual and constructive knowledge elements of premises liability claims and reinforced the distinction between knowledge as applied to unreasonably dangerous conditions compared to knowledge of antecedent situations. In doing so, the Court confirmed that the only relevant danger or condition about which the defendant’s knowledge is relevant is the actual premises condition—in this case the wet floor—rather than the antecedent situation that may have produced the dangerous condition, such as the Plaintiff’s allegation that leaking merchandise placed in a nearby shopping cart may have caused the premises condition. The Court confirmed that knowledge of an antecedent situation is irrelevant.

The Supreme Court also disavowed the court of appeals’ reliance on Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983), reiterating that Corbin was an “exceptional case” not applicable to most premises cases and that “[m]ore recent precedent points definitively in the opposite direction.” Corbin involved a grape display which was admittedly known to cause dangers on the floor beneath. “Unlike the grape display in Corbin, the method that Randalls used to store damaged and returned goods did not ‘constitute[] a dangerous condition from the moment it was used,’ nor did it ‘inherently present[] an unreasonable risk of harm.’” (emphasis in original).

The Court further limited Corbin to cases where “the defendant had a policy or practice that it knew routinely created an unreasonable risk of harm.” Here, the Court distinguished our facts because, while “[t]he evidence may have shown that a Randalls employee knowingly placed a leaking bag in the cart … there was no evidence that Randalls had a policy or practice of leaving leaky bags in shopping carts or that Randalls knew the problem routinely recurred.”

The Court’s opinion emphasizes the importance that parties and courts will place on company policies and practices and should remind companies to continue to review their policies and procedures to ensure best practices are being followed. Otherwise, Corbin may control and expand the potential liability of retailers.

Our client was represented in the Supreme Court by partner Scott B. Novak and associates Andrew J. Upton and William Roberts, along with former senior attorney Dylan Drummond. Partner Melanie R. Cheairs tried the case and secured the defense verdict.

The case is Albertsons, LLC et al. v. Mohammadi, No. 23-0041, 2024 WL 1470905 (Tex. Apr. 5, 2024).